Explain SMBC — the wiki for Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal

The Joke

A woman excitedly exclaims "Oh my God! A philosophical zombie!" Her companion asks "What?" and the woman explains: "They behave like they are conscious beings, but inside they don't really have consciousness."

The companion says "Where? I don't see them!" The woman replies: "You're talking about me." The companion responds: "You look insulted, but you don't really have feelings."

The Humor

The comic plays on the concept of "philosophical zombies" (p-zombies), a thought experiment in philosophy of mind. A p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is physically and behaviorally identical to a normal human but lacks subjective conscious experience -- there is "nothing it is like" to be a p-zombie. They act as if they feel pain, joy, and so on, but have no inner experience.

The joke works on multiple levels. First, the woman accuses her companion of being a p-zombie, which is inherently unfalsifiable (you cannot prove someone else has or lacks consciousness). But the real punchline is the companion turning it around: when the woman looks insulted at being called a p-zombie, the companion points out that if she truly were a p-zombie, she would not actually feel insulted -- she would only appear to be insulted. This perfectly illustrates the paradox at the heart of the p-zombie thought experiment: a p-zombie would deny being one and would display every outward sign of being conscious, making the concept practically untestable.

The humor also comes from the social awkwardness of telling someone to their face that they lack consciousness while they are standing right there reacting to the accusation.

References

• Philosophical zombies (p-zombies): A thought experiment in philosophy of mind, most associated with philosopher David Chalmers. A p-zombie is a hypothetical creature that is physically identical to a human and behaves identically but has no subjective conscious experience (no qualia). The concept is used to argue against physicalism -- if p-zombies are conceivable, then consciousness cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone.
• The Hard Problem of Consciousness: The p-zombie thought experiment is closely related to what Chalmers calls the "hard problem" -- explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience.